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Neo-Ottoman Cool: Turkish Popular Culture in the Arab Public Sphere 
Marwan M. Kraidy and Omar Al-Ghazzi 
University of Pennsylvania 
In the past decade, Turkish television drama has enjoyed popular success in the Arab world, fueling 
wide-ranging controversies in the pan-Arab public sphere. Such popularity is at first sight puzzling. After 
all, Arabs lived under Ottoman rule for 400 years, and for most of the 20th century Turkey’s foreign 
policy neglected Arab interests. Why, then, would Turkish drama be popular with Arab audiences, 
especially at a time of unprecedented vibrancy in Arab cultural production? This article grapples with 
that question via a systematic analysis of pan-Arab discourse about Turkish popular culture, concluding 
that some Turkish dramas conjure up an accessible modernity while others enact a counter-hegemonic 
narrative that puts Middle Easterners in the role of heroes. The rise of Turkish television drama in the 
Arab public sphere offers insights into the geopolitical underpinnings and geocultural consequences of 
transnational media flows. 
The July 20, 2008, edition of al-Quds al-Arabi, a London-based pan-Arab daily newspaper with an Arabist 
editorial line,1 featured a cartoon titled “Diseases of the Era” that had three side-by-side vignettes. The 
first vignette from the left presents a dazed looking black and white cow, front leg up, pupils dilated, 
tongue stuck out, and saliva splashing. The caption underneath says: “Mad Cow Disease.” In the middle 
vignette stands a miserable yellow fowl, looking as dazed as his bovine counterpart, with stars around 
his head and heavy and red eyelids, a tissue held in one wing and a runny nose, with the caption: “Bird 
Influenza.” The third vignette, to the left of the cartoon, features a dapper man, with hazel colored hair 
and a well-trimmed beard, in tuxedo and bowtie. The caption underneath the third vignette said: “The 
Nour Television Series!” 
By situating the Turkish television series Nour [Turkish original: Gümüş] as a craze on par with two 
infectious diseases, the cartoonist underscores the rapidly spreading popularity of Turkish television 
drama among Arab viewers in the summer of 2008. The cartoon is one of numerous utterances, 
including cartoons, op-eds, mosque sermons, talk-show debates, and fatwas, spurred by the success of 
Turkish series with Arabs. Such popularity is deeply paradoxical. After all, Arabs lived under Ottoman 
rule for 400 years, and for most of the 20th century Turkey’s foreign policy countered Arab interests by 
partnering with the United States, NATO, and Israel. Why, then, would Turkish drama be popular with 
Arab audiences, especially at a time of unprecedented vibrancy in Arab cultural production? Can 
television drama overcome centuries of mutual negative perceptions? Or is the paradoxical appeal of 
Turkish drama to Arabs due to broader cultural and geopolitical factors? 
This article grapples with the preceding questions, beginning with a brief historical aperçu of Turkish-
Arab relations during the last century and of political and media industry changes in Turkey in the last 
two decades. We then proceed with an analysis of a corpus of Arabic-language newspaper articles that 
reflect pan-Arab discourse about Turkish popular culture and conclude that the two dominant genres of 
Turkish television drama resonate with Arab viewers for related reasons: social drama conjures up an 
accessible modernity that is not wholly taken from the West, and political drama enacts a counter-
hegemonic narrative that puts Turks in particular and Middle Easterners in general in the role of 
heroes.2 In a shifting geopolitical context in which Turkey is assuming an increasingly central role in the 
culture, politics and economics of the Middle East, the popularity of Turkish television drama captures 
the notion of Neo-Ottoman Cool, a deeply ironic notion when Ottomanism served as the antiquated 
Other for both Kemalist Turkey and the Arab countries born from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. 
This research is not concerned with Turkish cultural production and Arab audience reception; rather, it 
focuses on Arab public discourse about Turkish media to understand how Turkey is discursively 
reproduced in the Arab public sphere. Against the backdrop of imperial Ottoman history and 
complicated Turkish-Arab relations in the modern era, the rise of Turkish media in the Arab public 
sphere offers insights into the geopolitical underpinnings of transnational media flows, best captured by 
the notion of Neo-Ottoman Cool. 
TURKEY AND THE ARAB WORLD: FROM THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE TO TRANSNATIONAL MEDIA 
History gave Arabs a fraught image of Turkey. After 400 years of Ottoman dominion over Arabs that 
ended post-World War 1, Turkish leader Mustafa Kemal Attaturk’s forced secularization drive in the 
early decades of the republic involved jettisoning the Arabic alphabet and cleansing Turkish of Arabic 
words (Bengio & Gencer, 2001, p. 55). Secularism, nationalism, and NATO membership during the 
second half of the 20th century distanced Turkey politically from its Arab neighbors.3 Several factors 
facilitated a change in Turko-Arab relations, including the 2001 launch of the Justice and Development 
Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, or AKP) by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül. Self-defined as 
“conservative democratic”—not Islamist (Taspinar, 2008)—the new party incorporated democratic, that 
is, electoral, politics in a pro-business platform reflecting the AKP’s pious and entrepreneurial 
constituency in mid-sized provincial cities that came to be known as the “Anatolian tigers” (White, 2012; 
Yavuz, 2006). The AKP consolidated its power in electoral victories since 2002, and a series of incidents 
suggest geopolitical maneuvering: the 2003 Parliamentary vote denying the United States permission to 
open a northern front in its impending invasion of Iraq, the AKP’s criticism of Israeli actions, and others. 
At the same time, Turkey’s robust diplomacy signaled an ambitious foreign policy that intensified 
discussions of “neo-Ottomanism” (Fisher Onar, 2009; Taspinar, 2008). 
In the two decades preceding the AKP’s rise, Turkish media underwent a structural transformation with 
two components. The first, occurring since the mid-1980s, is marked by concentration of ownership, 
dismantling of unions, and commercialization of the airwaves (Christensen, 2007). The acquisition of 
media companies by large conglomerates corporatized and politicized the Turkish media sphere as new 
media owners strove to expand their market share and political influence (Bek, 2004; Christensen, 
2007). It was “a period of enormous upheaval ... a period of unprecedented transformation in the media 
landscape of Turkey” (Aksoy & Robins, 2000). The second transformation, occurring since the mid-
1990s, entails a transnationalization of Turkish state and commercial media (Aksoy & Robins, 2000; 
Ayata, 2011; Karanfil, 2009). Seeking to reach Turkish migrants worldwide and Turkic populations in the 
ex-Soviet republics in addition to projecting influence across borders, transnational broadcasting began 
with the state organ TRT in 1990. After a 1994 law regularized private television, commercial channels 
began targeting Turks overseas, at first mostly in Europe, where they eclipsed TRT’s programs. 
The forces that transformed the Turkish media landscape were also at work in the Arab world. Since the 
1990s, the Arab media sector has become increasingly commercial and transnational, creating a pan-
Arab public sphere encompassing two dozen Arabic-speaking countries, and at the same time acutely 
increasing demand for content, which provided Turkish productions an opening into a market that 
currently boasts nearly 700 satellite channels in addition to national broadcasters. In tandem, then, 
parallel restructurings of the Turkish and Arab media industries, by creating “push” (on the Turkish side) 
and “pull” (on the Arab end) forces, set the ground for Turkish drama to enter Arab media space.4 
It is in that context that the Saudi-owned, Dubai-based pan-Arab satellite channel MBC first aired Nour 
in the summer of 2008. MBC is the lead channel of MBC Group, a conglomerate owned by a Saudi 
businessman with family connections to the Saudi royal family. MBC Group is one of a handful of leading 
multiplatform media companies to have evolved during the last two decades in what is often described 
as the “Arab satellite revolution” (see Kraidy & Khalil, 2009; Sakr, 2007). This was enabled by a pan-Arab 
satellite infrastructure developed since the 1960s by the Saudi-based Arab Satellite Organization 
(ARABSAT), under the aegis of the Arab League. When Saudis gravitated to CNN and other Western 
news sources during the 1991 Gulf War, Saudi authorities allowed privately owned satellite television 
channels, the first being MBC. From the beginning, then, long before the importation of dubbed Turkish 
television series, transnational broadcasting in the Arab world was undergirded by geopolitical concerns. 
The next sections show how these concerns play out in a slightly different but overall congruent manner 
in Arab discussions of Turkish social and political television drama. Nour and Valley of the Wolves, which 
generated the most heated debates in pan-Arab public discourse, will be analyzed as representatives of 
the two types. 
SOCIAL DRAMA: SOCIAL MOBILITY AND ACCESSIBLE MODERNITY 
A significant proportion of Turkish dramas dubbed in Arabic tell stories about the Istanbul elite and their 
problems with love, sex, marriage, family, money, violence, social class, and organized crime. These 
social dramas include the revealingly titled Years of Loss (Sanawat al-Daya‘), And Days Go By (Wa Tamdi 
al-Ayyam), The Lost Dream (al-Hilm al-Da’i‘), and Forbidden Love (al-‘Ishq al-Mamnu‘) (Al-Yazidi, 2009). 
Among these, Nour was by far the most popular. Nour features a rag-to-riches story articulated on a 
rural-urban axis and driven by romantic and sexual tensions typical of Latin American telenovelas. Nour 
is a young and ambitious woman from the Turkish hinterland who struggles to integrate with the rich 
Sadoğlu clan when she weds Muhannad, the chief male protagonist featured in the cartoon described in 
the introduction, and grandson of the Sadoğlus’ patriarch. 
Set in Istanbul against the backdrop of the Bosphorus and dubbed in spoken Syrian Arabic, the series’ 
more than 150 episodes became a transmedia event in the Arab world. According to MBC’s in-house 
viewer ratings, more than 84 million Arabic-speaking viewers watched the last episode of Nour on MBC 
(“84.5 million,” 2008), making it one of the most popular programs on Arab television and a social 
sensation. Stories circulated about the popularity of merchandise bearing images of the stars of Nour: 
“From the souks of Tunis to the markets of Occupied East Jerusalem, T-shirts bearing pictures of the 
glamorous Muhannad and Nour are selling like hot-cakes,” reported Agence France Press, quoting a 
street vendor near Damascus University saying that he sold more than 500 pictures of the stars a day 
near the campus (“Failed Turkish,” 2008). Other reports discussed the impact of the popularity of the 
series on business and tourism and reported a record increase in the number of Arab tourists visiting 
Turkey. In 2009 there was a 21% rise in the number of tourists from the United Arab Emirates to Turkey 
and 50% increase from Morocco (Bilbassy-Charters, 2010). Some journalists began to see the “Turkish 
invasion” of Arab television as a threat to Egypt and Syria, the two dominant Arab television drama 
production centers, with one Syrian critic arguing that Syrian serials had received a “knockout blow from 
Turkish ...series” (Uthman, 2008). This critique is ironic because dubbing into the Syrian colloquial 
helped popularize Turkish drama across the Arabic-speaking world, after the previous success of Syrian 
drama (“The viewer,” 2008). According to Arab commentators, the mix of popularity and controversy 
that met Nour and other Turkish series can be understood in three main registers: style and aesthetics, 
gender and spousal relations, and social values. 
Style and Aesthetics 
Arab commentators argued that Turkish series had higher production values and scored better than 
their Arab counterparts in their portrayal of style, beauty, and fashion. In Syrian and Egyptian musalsalat 
[serialized dramas; sing: musalsal], actors’ and actresses’ dress and make-up are over-done, especially in 
domestic scenes.5 In Syrian drama, it is a common occurrence for a female character to wake up with full 
make-up and hairdo. Many Syrian actresses appear to have surgically puffed lips and chiseled noses, 
marking stars and the characters they play as inaccessible. In contrast, Arab commentators argued that 
Turkish dramas depict modernity as way of life accessible to average viewers, not only stars and 
celebrities. Turkish drama has influenced Arab fashion trends, beauty tips and interior design. In Jordan, 
hairstyles bearing the names of Nour and Muhannad rose to popularity for women and men (Badr, 
2008). The pan-Arab daily al-Quds al-Arabi reported that Jordanian girls’ “obsession” with Turkish drama 
fashion is not limited to clothes and hair but also to eyebrow tattoos and hair coloring, like female stars 
in Nour and Years of Loss (Al-Sheikh, 2008). There were also reports about the popularity of Muhannad’s 
leather jackets with young men and household items such as bedclothes with Muhannad and Nour 
themes (Afra, 2008). Nour was clearly a pan-Arab transmedia event. 
One Arab critic contrasted the Turkish Nour with the Syrian musalsal, Bab al-Hara (The Neighborhood 
Gate), which topped drama ratings across the Arab world in 2006 and 2007 before the advent of Turkish 
drama. Bab al-Hara ran for five seasons, ending in 2010. It is the most popular series in the Syrian drama 
genre known as al-bi’a al-shamiyya (the Damascene environment), nostalgically evoking and imagining 
early 20th century neighborhood life in Damascus, with controversial representations: glorification of 
chivalrous men engaging in leadership and violence, set against portrayals of women as subservient and 
humiliated. The episodes are shot in a studio and most of the scenes are indoor. All these details 
contrast with a Turkish musalsal like Nour, which “looks to the future and addresses the mind of the 
viewer in the 21st century.” It ignores old, “shabby” neighborhoods and focuses instead on modern, 
attractive characters, beautiful mansions and captivating scenes of Istanbul and the Bosphorus (Al-
Yazidi, 2008). 
Some writers did criticize Nour on social and stylistic grounds, arguing it was repetitive and predictable 
with its exaggerated depictions of “sobbing, violence, torture, chases, rape, kidnapping, concentrated 
use of guns and daggers which result in repeated visits to hospitals and jails. There are also repeated 
incidents of divorce, marriage and fights over custody ... and ... imposed touristic scenes” (‘Abdulhamid, 
2009). There was also religious discourse attacking Nour on moral grounds. Such critique, however, was 
a discordant note in an otherwise positive discourse about the appeal of the production style in Turkish 
drama. 
Gender and Spousal Relations 
According to Arab journalists and commentators, another ingredient behind the success of Turkish 
musalsalat is their portrayal of spousal relations, with a focus on women. The Arab press noted that 
several Turkish series feature romantic representations of loving couples, not only young and hip but 
also old grandparents (Shahin, 2008). On YouTube, the most shared videos from Nour, with million-plus 
views, are of sensual and romantic scenes. Some clearly target women viewers, with the camera 
focusing on sensual depictions of the male actors’ bodies. Censorship of “inappropriate” scenes during 
Arabic-dubbing in Syria “in order to protect Arab public sensibilities” (“Nour the Turkish,” 2008) has 
prompted numerous Arab fans to download the original Turkish versions of the series and upload them 
on YouTube in an act of defiance. 
Nour is a successful fashion professional whose handsome and romantic husband, Muhannad, regularly 
expresses love and appreciation to his wife. Arab commentary focused on the popularity of Muhannad, 
played by the Turkish actor Kıvanç Tatlıtuğ, with Arab women viewers. According to several news 
reports, Arab female viewers’ fascination with the series and its star caused divorces in Sudan, Syria, and 
Saudi Arabia. Salamandra (2012) writes that the success of Nour is due to what she calls the “Muhannad 
Effect,” Muhannad’s activation of women’s viewing pleasure. “The most subversive element of the 
series,” she argues, “was ... the display of a Muslim—yet Turkish and foreign-looking—male body for 
Arab female consumption” (p. 67). One Western commentator went as far as arguing that Muhannad 
has become “the standard against which many Arab men are being judged” (Gubash, 2008). Though 
perhaps too much is attributed to Muhannad, Nour’s treatment of gender relations was a key trigger of 
controversy. 
Religious and Social Values 
The debate about Turkish drama in the Arab world also took up the role of Islam as a bridge between 
Turkish productions and Arab viewers. Arab journalists contended that the Istanbul elite lifestyle 
enjoyed by television drama characters does not reflect the situation of a majority of ordinary Turks, 
who tend to be conservative and observant Muslims (Salha, 2010), or that Turkish musalsalat 
represented “a distorted image of Western values, which secular Turkey is trying to imitate,” an image 
disconnected from the lives of Muslims both in Turkey and the Arab world (‘Abdulrazzaq, 2008). On the 
other hand, some of the television drama characters are shown to observe Muslim holidays, including 
fasting during Ramadan and following Muslim religious rituals at funerals and weddings. Since most 
Arabs and most Turks are Muslims, expressions of religiosity uttered by Turkish characters sound natural 
in Syrian Arabic. 
Conservative Arab clerics, however, took action to fight what they saw as Turkish drama’s harmful 
effects. The Mufti of the Syrian city of Aleppo issued a fatwa banning prayer while wearing shirts 
depicting stars from the series Nour (Badr, 2008). Islamist activists in the southern Iraqi city of al-
Nasiriyya laid pictures of the Turkish actor Kıvanç Tatlıtug˘ on the streets so that people would step on 
them to express their condemnation of Turkish series’ irreligious content (“Iraqis surprised,” 2008). In 
Kuwait, the Ministry of Education issued a decree ordering schools to forbid students from using Nour-
themed stationery, vowing to form committees to oversee the decree’s implementation (Nayef, 2008). 
Even stronger condemnations came from ultra-conservative Saudi clerics, with Mufti ‘Abdulaziz Bin 
Abdullah al-Shaykh issued a fatwa banning the “debased, corrupt ... and harmful” Nour, which in his 
view encouraged viewers to “commit sin.” He also attacked Nour’s producers as “soldiers of the devil” 
and accused Arab channels’ owners that air Nour of having “declared war on God and his Prophet” 
(Shayma, 2008). However, though Saudi princes and investors control leading Arab satellite channels, 
including MBC, which aired Nour, the mufti’s stinging rebuke had no effect whatsoever in stemming the 
series’ popularity in Saudi Arabia or in influencing the programming decisions of Arab satellite channels. 
This followed a pattern set by previous controversies—about television comedy, reality television, and 
music videos—that reveal limits of clerical control over Arab populations and their media diet.  
POLITICAL DRAMA: COUNTERHEGEMONIC STORIES AND MIDDLE EAST POLITICS 
Turkish dramas with explicitly political themes also resonated with Arab viewers, especially those 
sympathetic to the Palestinian cause.6 The most prominent was Valley of the Wolves, a movie and 
television series that caused a diplomatic row between Turkey and Israel. Valley of the Wolves was 
dubbed into the Syrian vernacular and aired by Abu Dhabi TV between 2007 and 2012. It tells the story 
of a Turkish intelligence officer, Polar Alemdar (Murad Alemdar in Arabic) who unravels plots against 
Turkey and retaliates against foreign conspirators and local collaborators in the name of Turkish pride 
and Middle Eastern solidarity. Some of Alemdar’s exploits occurred beyond Turkish borders, notably in 
Northern Iraq, Israel, and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and both films and television series 
featured graphic violence against US troops in Iraq and Israeli troops in the occupied territories. 
Tensions arose with negative depictions of Israelis and Jews in Valley of the Wolves–Iraq, and Arab 
media extensively covered the ensuing Turkish-Israeli row. That season centered on what Turks know as 
the July 2003 “hood event,” when US soldiers led Turkish commandos in Sulaymaniyya, Iraq, at 
gunpoint, with hoods over their heads, into 60 hours of detention. Though the United States later 
apologized, Turkish media condemned the incident as an insult to Turkish pride, triggering anti-US 
protests in Istanbul and Ankara (“Regret over,” 2003). The official website of Valley of the Wolves–Iraq 
described the event as a US attempt “to be the only power calling the shots. To them there is no place 
for Turks in the region anymore” (“Pana Films,” 2006). 
In the film a Turkish First Lieutenant commits suicide after feeling dishonored by the “hood incident,” 
leaving a note that compels Alemdar to avenge his colleague. Alemdar travels to northern Iraq and 
observes US forces humiliating the local population. Particular scorn is reserved for a US commander 
called Sam Marshall, who was responsible for the “hood event” and for raiding a wedding party in 
northern Iraq and killing the groom and dozens of civilians. An unlikely alliance emerges between the 
Iraqi bride-widow and Alemdar who together seek revenge against the US officer (“About Film,” 2006). 
The movie depicts Turkish commandos as unequivocal heroes, Americans and Israelis as unmistakable 
villains. The Arab press described how the series features Israeli agents kidnapping children and Israelis 
smuggling body parts. In one particularly contentious episode, as Alemdar storms a Mossad post to 
rescue a Turkish boy, he shoots the Mossad agent, whose blood splatters on the Star of David of the 
Israeli flag (“Turkey TV,” 2010). 
Israel accused the series of anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic content, triggering a mediatized Turkish-Israeli 
diplomatic storm in January 2010, which temporarily appeared to jeopardize the two countries’ strategic 
alliance. Israel’s deputy foreign minister summoned the Turkish ambassador to Tel Aviv to the Knesset 
rather than to the foreign ministry, and was made to sit on a low couch, which made him appear on 
cameras to be on a lower level than the Israeli diplomat. The Turkish flag was removed from the table 
and the two diplomats did not shake hands for the cameras (“Turkey TV,” 2010). An Israeli Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs statement accused the series of showing Jews as war criminals, arguing: “This is 
unacceptable ... and puts the lives of Jews in Turkey in danger” (“Valley of,” 2010). Furious at Israel’s 
diplomatic rebuff, Ankara demanded an apology, which it received in the form of a letter to the Turkish 
ambassador. Pana Films dismissed Israeli accusations, pledging that Valley of the Wolves would 
“continue to say the truth and expose the guilty,” and wondering how Israel’s leaders could “shell 
refugee children hiding under the banner of the United Nations (in Gaza) [but] feel upset when real 
events are told by Valley of the Wolves?” (“Valley of,” 2010). 
Arab media closely followed the Turkish-Israeli row, casting Turkey as proactive and Israel as reactive. A 
headline from this period declared: “A New Crisis between Ankara and Tel Aviv: Erdo˘gan Threatens 
Israel and Demands an Apology for Insulting his Ambassador” (Andrawus, 2010). A Lebanese daily 
opined that Turkey “does not shy away from its frank position towards Israel ...and exposes Mossad as 
the ghost behind many assassinations and mafias that infiltrate the Turkish state and its agencies” 
(Hassan, 2010), while a United Arab Emirates paper wrote that Israeli-Turkish relations have “almost 
reached the brink, especially that the Turkish position is brave and resolute in defending Turkish pride 
and international standing,” and that it would behoove Israel to be more ashamed of the images of the 
horrific deaths it caused in Gaza rather than of Valley of the Wolves (Na‘san Agha, 2010). Valley of the 
Wolves-Palestine, released in 2011 in Turkey and Europe, revolves around the Mavi Marmara, the 
Turkish Gaza-siege busting ship stormed by Israeli commandos in May 2010. The deaths of nine Turkish 
citizens on board caused an anti-Israeli uproar in Turkey and in the Arab world. In the film, Alemdar 
leads Turkish commandos into the occupied territories to liquidate the Israeli commander of the Mavi 
Marmara raid. When during fighting an Israeli soldier asks Alemdar: “Why did you come to Israel?” He 
answers: “I did not come to Israel, I came to Palestine” (“Germany stops,” 2011). 
Some journalists were skeptical of images of Turkish regional heroism and critical of Turkey’s hypocrisy, 
constructing an anti-American and anti-Israeli self-image but also maintaining close economic and 
military relations with the United States and Israel. Reflecting Saudi anxiety toward Turkey, the Saudi-
owned al-Hayat’s take conflated Turkey with Alemdar, who “does not understand the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict” and “does not seem to be interested to do so.”7 Rather, the article portrays Alemdar as 
interested in liquidating the Israeli general allegedly responsible for killing Turkish citizens aboard the 
Mavi Marmara, without caring to understand the “complexity” of the Middle East conflict (Ya‘qub, 
2011). Al-Hayat dismissed Alemdar, wondering “whether the world really needs a Turkish Rambo” 
(Ya‘qub, 2011). Another article concluded that soon “we find that the Turkish wolf is chasing the Israelis 
on television; meanwhile security, political and economic ties between [the two countries] would 
continue” (Ussi, 2010). Nonetheless, Arab media coverage of the issue bolstered Turkey’s status by 
framing the series as a tool in regional geopolitics. In reality, the significance of Valley of the Wolves 
resides less in its artistic or factual merits, and more in its reversal of Hollywood’s routine 
representations of Arabs and Muslims as villains and its glorification of Turkish power (see Yanik, 2009). 
It is therefore narratively counterhegemonic, though the Arab commentariat’s reading of Valley of the 
Wolves in purely geopolitical terms obscures the economic and cultural factors discussed below. 
NEO-OTTOMAN COOL: TRANSNATIONAL MEDIA, GEOPOLITICS, MODERNITIES 
Several implications can be teased out of the saga of Turkish television drama in the Arab world for the 
study of transnational media and their cultural and geopolitical dimensions. The argument that 
extensive transnational flows signify a weak state is not one of them. Indeed, the Turkish state played a 
role in promoting television drama in the Arab world, recruiting famous actors to promote Turkish 
exports.8 By highlighting cross-border media flows on a regional scale, our case study transcends the 
West versus Rest binary that still riddles some global communication research in variations of cultural 
imperialism and bipolar formulae such as “local” against “global.” Though a history of imperialism 
shapes ongoing processes of globalization, imperial dynamics of power, resistance, and accommodation 
in culture and politics are arguably most manifest on a regional scale. In East Asia, contemporary 
transnational cultural trajectories reflect a history of Japanese imperialism, and in Latin America the 
Spanish language—whose widespread adoption is the most enduring legacy of the Spanish Empire—is 
the primary enabler of a regional geo-linguistic market. 
The populist-commercial logic of contemporary media and popular culture makes it more likely to travel 
across national and cultural boundaries. As Iwabuchi (2001) argued in the case of Japan’s Asian media 
exports:  
Unlike traditional culture, by which the irreducible difference between one culture from others tends to 
be emphasized, popular culture, though highly commercialized, reminds Japan and “Asia” alike of 
cultural similarities, a sense of living in the shared time and common experience of a certain 
(post)modernity which cannot be represented well by American popular culture. The ascent of Japanese 
dramas is closely associated with the scent of a modernity in Asia that Japanese dramas embody. (p. 56) 
As with Japan in East Asia, Turkish popular culture travels well in the Middle East not because of 
language or because of a face-value cultural proximity: Turkish and Arabic are mutually 
incomprehensible, some migrated words notwithstanding, and mutual perceptions are still often riddled 
with hostile stereotypes. Though the Arab world itself can be said to be a relatively seamless 
geolinguistic market, the Middle East, with Turkey, Iran and Israel, is hardly so.9 Nour’s Arab popularity, 
then, is deeply paradoxical. 
The transnational dynamics described in this article call for a multiple modernities perspective that 
would acknowledge that Turkey and the Arab world share common histories and memories, and 
therefore will gravitate towards similar assemblages of the modern. As Iwabuchi argues in the case of 
Japan’s popular culture in Taiwan, the popularity of Japanese pop culture is less attributable to the fact 
that Japan and Taiwan live in the same historical time—what Fabian (1983) calls coevalness. Japanese 
pop is “culturally odourless” in Taiwan. Similarly, in the case of Turkey and the Arab world, it is a certain 
permutation of historical times that cohabitate in the contemporary Middle East, of which Turkey is 
currently the most appealing example. 
In this logic, contradictions in the AKP’s rhetoric (Fisher Onar, 2011; White, 2012) are not, as some critics 
allege, evidence of political hypocrisy and a “secret agenda” but rather symptoms of a struggle to 
elaborate a Turkish modernity that is selectively both Western and Islamic. As White (2012) recently 
argued:  
The AKP in its contradictory discourses supporting universalist principles of human rights while at the 
same time curtailing freedom of speech and openly opposing lifestyles that do not conform to a 
conservative worldview ...[T]hese contradictions ...express the dual nature of political and social life as 
open to innovation while being communally limited. (p. 17) 
As several scholars have noted (Bozda˘glio˘gliu, 2008; Fisher Onar, 2011; Keyman, 2007; Özyürek, 2006; 
White, 2012), Turkish modernity is politically and culturally hybrid. After decades of Kemalist state-led 
modernization based on nationalism and secularism, Turkish modernity has shifted as religion has 
become more politicized, economically grounded (in the rise of Anatolia’s pious bourgeois medium-sized 
business owners), and the primary basis for demands of cultural recognition (Keyman, 2007, p. 216). 
Secularism, once a pillar of Turkish modernity, has been in crisis since the 1990s, as a political Islam 
claiming to be modern, and hence legitimate, is fueled by economic growth and a rising profile abroad. 
Sacralized, de-privatized, and, so to speak, “monetized,” religion is now a building block of Turkish 
modernity. The ongoing syncretism of Turkish modernity, now with a religious element that remains 
contested by a secularist legacy, resonates with similar searches for a negotiated Arab modernity. The 
elaboration of a selective modernity adapted to local historical and social realities often takes shape in 
contentious debates around popular culture and its imputed effects on society. Such was the case with 
the reality television controversies that rocked the Arab public sphere in the preceding decade (Kraidy, 
2010). 
Neo-Ottoman Cool, then, is grounded in a Turkish modernity that has been attractive to Arabs because 
it manages to combine a variety of hitherto separate and seemingly contradictory political, economic 
and socio-cultural elements in one seductive “package,” what one Arab columnist captured as “[A] 
European, Islamic, Secular, Capitalist Turkey” (Khoury, 2009, emphasis added). Clearly a manifestation of 
what Latin American scholars such as García-Canclini (1994) and Martín-Barbero (1993) call tiempos 
mixtos, or mixed temporalities, Turkey appears to have momentarily pulled off a juggling act—the 
elaboration of a uniquely Turkish modernity—which resonates with Arab popular aspirations. Arab 
reactions to Turkish television drama and its treatment of social and political issues support our 
contention.10 
The pan-Arab success of Turkish drama enables a deeper understanding of Arab public opinion of 
Turkey. Arabs face Turkey with a combination of desire and anxiety, akin to the ways in which 
Taiwanese, Koreans and others viewed Japan and its television dramas (Iwabuchi, 2004). 
Nonetheless, Arabs have been so disappointed and resentful toward the United States after Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and continued US support for Israeli policies that the mere promise of a non-Western 
power rising in their neighborhood endows neo-Ottomanism with significant allure. For many Arabs, the 
rise of Turkey holds the promise of literally de-centering Western power in the Middle East, that is, 
removing the West as the necessary central mediator between different countries and cultures in the 
Middle East. The re-centering of Turkey as a pivotal state and a great power that coincides with a 
reduced Western role is a foundation of the political, economic, and socio-cultural capital that fuels 
Neo-Ottoman Cool. 
In this context, Turkish drama conjures a twofold model of masculinity that echoes a dual model of 
power. Nour’s Muhannad and The Valley of Wolves’ Alemdar are two faces of the same coin. Whereas 
Muhannad is understood as a domestic, attractive, though silent and passive husband (see Salamandra, 
2012), Alemdar is the martial, fearless, vocal and pro-active commando. They are conquerors, one 
operating through sexual seduction, another through military aggression. Arab discourses about the two 
male protagonists establish them as icons of a Turkish, and by extension, Middle Eastern modern 
masculinity. If the trope of neo-Ottomanism was invoked by Arab pundits concerned about the return of 
regional Turkish influence (hence the “Ottoman”) but in a different, that is, diplomatic, cultural, and 
economic—guise (hence the “neo”), then coverage of Muhannad and Alemdar establishes them as cool 
neo-Ottomans, more alluring and muscled versions of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan. 
At the same time, the transmedia campaigns built around television series and their stars turn Turkish 
identity into a commodity to be personally consumed, nostalgically by some within Turkey (Özyürek, 
2006), “aspirationally” in the Arab world. Since the late 1980s, Turkish modernity has been enacted 
through everyday life consumerism, which articulates disparate religious, economic, and political 
elements of the “package” of Turkish modernity. Nour and Valley of the Wolves are linchpins of 
multiplatform marketing campaigns for a gamut of products including clothing, accessories, perfume, 
jewelry, and furniture. Nour’s targeting of upwardly mobile women and Valley of the Wolves’ catering to 
young adult males, presumably angry and politicized, not only makes them appealing vehicles for 
advertisers, but also enables different segments of Turkish society to interact with social and political 
issues through consumptive practices, much as Özyürek (2006) describes the nostalgic consumption of 
the symbols and tropes of the early formative years of Kemalism. In this context, the popularity of 
Turkish series in the Arab world can be read as the result of twin forces. On the one hand, Turkish 
capitalist growth requires the successful marketing of lifestyle consumerism grafted onto themes and 
stars from television for continued expansion. On the other hand, the growth of consumer society in the 
Arab world and the tantalizing possibility that a local modernity is accessible through consumption fuel 
the growth of these media markets. 
From that perspective, then, Neo-Ottoman Cool is a productive, however ironic, notion to capture both 
underlying causes and outcomes of Turkey’s rising status in the Arab world, facilitated by the political 
bankruptcy of competing powers: Saudi Arabia’s clerico-religious system is a liability in the race for the 
hearts and minds of Arabs, and Iran’s anti-US and anti-Israel vitriol, compounded by the Sunni-Shi‘i split, 
has failed to sway large segments of Arab public opinion. Turkey’s allure, with its glamorous stars and its 
popular politicians, has recently been complicated by Turkey’s growing involvement in the Arab 
uprisings, especially in Syria. Nonetheless, Turkey’s position in the Middle East may become more 
central as Muslim Brotherhood affiliated parties friendly to the AKP’s blend of religion, capitalism and 
electoral politics take over Arab governments. The most singular achievement of the AKP in this regard 
might be its success in uprooting anti-Turkish sentiment in the Arab world without affecting a deep 
geopolitical shift, relying instead on media, popular culture, diplomacy and skillful oratory to create the 
aura of Neo-Ottoman Cool. 
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Note: 
1“Arabist” means broadly Arab nationalist, opposed to Israeli occupation of Palestinian land and to 
Western intervention in Arab affairs. 
2Drawn from a larger project, this research is based on an extensive textual analysis of the coverage of 
Turkey and Turkish popular culture by leading pan-Arab and national Arab daily newspapers and 
magazines, totaling more than 100 Arabic-language items published during the last decade. 
3Turkey was the first Muslim-majority country to recognize the state of Israel; as a member of NATO 
since 1952, Ankara allowed the United States to use its military bases to intervene in the Middle East, 
starting with the 1958 civil strife in Lebanon. After Western powers declined to support Turkey over its 
invasion of parts of Cyprus in 1964, Turkey sided with Egypt on the eve of the 1967 Six-Day War and 
denied the United States permission to use Turkish bases to assist Israel in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. 
Because of rising oil prices in the 1970s, Turkey dramatically boosted trade with the Arab states and 
Iran, bringing the country closer to its neighbors, though Arab lack of support on Cyprus and Syria’s 
sheltering of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan at a time when the PKK was actively involved in anti-Turkish 
terrorism constrained the rapprochement. Turkey supported coalition forces in the 1991 Gulf War, 
signed a military treaty with Israel in 1996, and threatened military action against Syria in 1998 if 
Damascus continued to shelter Öcalan. 
4The media flow and shift in perceptions of relations between Arabs and Turks have been unidirectional. 
Turkey has addressed Arab publics and exploited its popular culture exports for geopolitical advantage. 
However, no Arab country has engaged with the Turkish public on the level of popular culture because, 
quite simply, the current geopolitical battleground for influence in the greater Middle East consist of 
Arab countries. 
5Turkish dramas are not perfect in that regard. In one episode of Nour, the female protagonist appeared 
with make up as she walked out of a medical operation in the wake of her miscarriage. 
6The two series al-Gharib (The Stranger)andal-Firaq (Separation) told stories sympathetic to Palestinians: 
Separation met with Israeli opposition when its first episode showed scenes of Israeli soldiers killing 
Palestinian civilians, including children, women, and the elderly. Al-Firaq’s writers and production team 
saw the series as a call for peace and coexistence. The Turkish government censored some scenes in the 
second episode showing the execution of Palestinians, but the Israeli government objected to the series 
nonetheless. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu himself said that airing Separation on Turkish 
national television channel TRT was tantamount to a “provocation” and accused the series of incitement 
to hatred, while Turkish authorities denied that the series had any political agenda (Al-Bayari, 2009). 
Another musalsal, Sarkhet Hajar (A Stone’s Cry) also depicted the daily life of Palestinians under Israeli 
military occupation and explored Palestinian political division and social taboos (Bilbassy-Charters, 
2010). 
7This reflects Saudi anxiety about Turkish competition for leadership of Sunni Muslims in the Middle 
East, an economically weak and politically unstable Egypt no longer being a serious contender. 
8The Turkish government announced that it would give prizes and financial awards to support producers 
and directors to create media products that help Turkey’s image and market Turkish products abroad. 
Also, actor Kıvanç Tatlıtu˘g, who plays Muhannad on Nour, was scheduled to visit Egypt in February 
2011 on a trip sponsored by the Turkish embassy in Cairo to promote an Istanbul shopping festival, 
though the January 25 revolution in Egypt forced a change of plans (Al-Qashuti, 2011). 
9See Straubhaar (1991). For critical discussions of cultural proximity, see Iwabuchi (2001) and Kraidy 
(2005) 
10The popularity of Turkish television drama in Greece and Bulgaria and large Turkish economic 
investments in several East European neighbors, cautions against imputing the success of Turkish 
cultursal production in the Arab world to a pan-Islamic identity or solidarity. 
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